Sunday, March 30, 2014

Zero Tolerance, Evil Objects, and the Psychosis of the Left

Zero Tolerance, Evil Objects, and the Psychosis of the Left

Why I think some liberals, fewer conservatives and most Muslims are pathological.


Progressives pride themselves on their highly evolved psyches, their awe-inspiring good intentions and their admirable sense of right and wrong.  Indeed, so sure are they that they are right, disagreement can only be an insult.  Opposition triggers instant hatred, in a chorus chanted so loudly that nothing said, no evidence presented, will be heard or considered.  Indeed, in order to cement a belief, whatever the left decides to believe magically becomes new science, granted an exemption from any sort of scientific process because the leftist has declared that a consensus of leftists makes something scientific.  Belief alone is the sole test.  This process is, quite literally, detached from reality, as if written by an inebriated Charles Dodgson. 
Yet, how evolved or scientific is it to believe something that cannot be true under the laws of nature?  Isn’t history full of cultures that believed in impossible things because their place in time, or the limited information available to them, fed their fears and amplified their illusions?  Human sacrifice pleased their gods.  Birth defects were punishment for sin.  Witchcraft explained accidents or coincidences.  Such creatures would be considered primitive and un-evolved in our time, given the span of human progress, the explosion of knowledge, and the fact that we are at the pinnacle of whatever evolution we have undergone so far.  We look back at the prejudices of such people and recognize, from our more informed and enlightened perch, that their beliefs were driven by their limited ability to know the reasons for what occurred around them, and that in the absence of knowledge, irrational fear needs the comfort of answers, even if contrary to nature.  
How then to explain that, despite human progress, such people are still among us in astounding numbers, defying the very Darwinian theories to which they have vehemently sworn allegiance?  Proudly, even aggressively, they practice the ignorance our species has spent centuries overcoming, reverting to the purely emotional embrace of mythology and superstition to explain what they do not understand, or to validate their deeply held prejudices, even though evidence refuting their fantasies is readily at hand.   Aside from the latest superstition that weather is punishment for man’s misdeeds, fewer delusions are more firmly held on the left than the pure certainty that guns, despite being inanimate objects, are possessed of evil. 
While there are certainly progressives who rationally understand the political obstacle that guns present to their political enslavement of other men, such powerful operatives are numerically few, even if possessed of much power.   The majority of the delusional are of lower influence but are innumerable, and appear convinced that their survival depends on controlling or abolishing what they do not understand, and which does not threaten them in any event.
Indeed, in the example of guns, they expressly believe that some firearms possess quantifiably greater evil than others, depending entirely on their appearance, despite being lifeless objects.  An equivalent belief would be that a paring knife is certainly evil, but a carving knife is purely demonic.  To a rational person, such an unhinged thought process more than merely hints at lunacy.  Inanimate objects do not possess inherent evil.  It can’t be built in, absorbed or grown inside a gun.  In fact, the only things on Earth that have that ability are people.  And yet, despite living in a world defined by reality, evidence, facts, logic and physics, progressives deny all truths that conflict with their beliefs. They practice pure, unadulterated anti-intellectualism.  They have substituted magic and mythology for truth. 
The progressives’ ideation of guns fully crosses over into the talismanic realm.  At the capacity of their reasoning on this issue, they believe that not just a gun but even a picture of a gun, or a shirt referencing a gun, or fingers that clearly are not a gun, or a Pop-Tart bitten into the shape of a gun is possessed of actual evil, and that all of these exercise a remarkable, powerful influence on human feelings and action.  If not, why else “control” them?  They believe these objects or images emanate a force they cannot see or feel, but one they are absolutely convinced is there and magically affects others, if only their philosophical and political opponents on a range of similarly divergent beliefs.  Progressives personify the gun by attributing to it human evil.  What they believe is so ludicrous as to be, quite literally, insane: each gun, even the idea of a gun, must be “controlled” or it will do harm. 
As we have seen when behavior is unmoored from reality, the fears are indulged and the voices appeased by irrational action.  Just as the mentally affected attacker is so disconnected from reality that he believes his actions to be justified no matter the innocence of the harmed, the progressive believes that all harm he or she does in the name of conquering these inanimate objects is necessary.  It is a self-serving release of their emotions into concrete action, and by asserting even defective control, they believe they are defeating what is evil within their limited ability to understand.  It matters not that there is no actual connection between belief and reality.  It only matters what they believe.  Truth and evidence, once valued commodities, are now derided as the deceptive tools of modern day “deniers”.      
Of course, when irrational people are entirely convinced of imaginary things, the only foolproof way to deal with the offending thing is to destroy it.  As we are beginning to see in the increasingly zealous prosecution of absurd zero tolerance rules, such as suspending a kindergartner for the equivalent of terrorism because he pointed his finger, there is no middle ground.  Scare them young, make examples of the clearly innocent, and all will see and fall into line out of fear of the state and those who will imprison you over imaginary threats.
Where such psychosis leads is now on display in Connecticut, which has adopted an Obama’esque “red line” by implementing a gun registration law that most have refused to obey.  Connecticut’s budding fascists must either go Full Brownshirt in their determined assault on the Constitution, thereby fomenting open revolt by those peacefully doing what the Constitution protects, or they will have to back down and risk criticism for not preventing the evil they believe the guns will do if not forcibly taken from those who lack their total disconnection from reality.
Throughout history, the progressives of each era started with propaganda, then “progressed” to banning, confiscation, imprisonment and worse.  They are the book burners of our age.  Knowing they must rig the game to win, they have enacted laws necessary to criminalize their fellow citizens.   No matter their assurances, the only thing that will quell their fear and smother dissent is to wage war on the imaginary, extending their control even to how one is allowed to think about make-believe things.  Despite their past denials, and their ridicule of those who employ logic and reason, they have exposed themselves, finally forced by their legislation to explain how far they are prepared to go to quiet the voices in their heads.  Confiscation is how far.  Nothing else will ever be enough. 

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Feinstein: No Evidence Terrorists Behind Missing Malaysian Plane




Feinstein: No Evidence Terrorists Behind Missing Malaysian Plane
Sunday, 30 Mar 2014 11:21 AM
By Sandy Fitzgerald
There has been a great deal of speculation about the reasons for the disappearance of a Malaysia Airlines flight just over three weeks ago, but there's no evidence of terrorism, said Senate Intelligence Committee Chairwoman Dianne Feinstein.

"So far, there's been none," the California Democrat told CNN's Candy Crowley on Sunday's "State of the Union" program. "There's speculation, but there's nothing."

Feinstein noted the situation is "very hard" because searchers and officials "don't have what they need to carefully calculate a reasonable area where they plane may be. This is a very difficult mission."

There are many nations participating in the search, Feinstein said, "but there is no real method of calculation that is functioning very well."

Crowley noted that some of the satellite photos coming from the area where the plane is suspected to have landed are not as clear as other satellite photos can be. She showed the difference between photos of the ocean and satellite photos taken of Osama Bin Laden's compound a few years ago, and asked if more sophisticated satellites could target the suspected crash site.

"I'm not going to go in to what we do have or what we don't have," Feinstein said. "You have to understand that American intelligence doesn't gear itself to be ready for plane crashes."

Meanwhile, Feinstein said that she is sure that if asked, U.S. intelligence services would provide whatever data they have. She stressed that Malaysia is in charge of the investigation, and the United States can offer its advice, "but you can't demand."

Also on Sunday's show, Feinstein discussed her ongoing issues with the CIA over allegations it searched a congressional computer network. She voiced her objections in a dramatic speech on the Senate floor in early March, and told Crowley Sunday that her words on that day should stand on the incident.

"I don't know if you've noticed I have done no press on this, after I did a 40-minute speech," Feinstein said. "I believe it is accurate and those words should stand."

But while Feinstein has asked for an apology from the CIA and a statement that congressional computer networks would not be searched, that has not happened.

"The CIA went into walled off Senate computers being used in a bona fide investigation that's being done on the detention and interrogation of detainees" said Feinstein. "It isn't the first time, [they did this] it's the third time."

But despite their differences, Feinstein said she and the CIA "are on speaking terms" and had a good hearing about Syria this past Thursday.

"We are in the process of beginning a fuller investigation on all the intelligence programs of this country," said Feinstein. The irony is that the National Security Agency's program of data collection is the most-overseen program we have, and there thousands of other programs that need a look at."

President Barack Obama has said he wants a bill to transfer storage of phone data away from the NSA and leave it with phone companies, who would need to turn over information only when a warrant is served, a plan with which Finstein agrees.

"The issue is whether the telecoms are willing to hold this data," said Feinstein. "When we talked with them, they were not."

She said it's likely that if the storage bill is passed, phone companies would "have to be compelled legislatively in a bill and be provided with liability immunity."

Malaysia
Joseph Y. Yun is a U.S. ambassador for Malaysia, and was the deputy assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of State.

Note: James Keith was a U.S. ambassador for Malaysia, and the deputy assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of State.
John F. Kerry is the secretary at the U.S. Department of State for the Barack Obama administration, and married to Teresa Heinz Kerry.
Teresa Heinz Kerry is married to John F. Kerry, an honorary trustee at the Brookings Institution (think tank), a trustee at the Carnegie Museums of Pittsburgh, and a life trustee at the Carnegie Mellon University.
Foundation to Promote Open Society was a funder for the Brookings Institution (think tank), the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (think tank), and the Aspen Institute (think tank).
George Soros was the chairman for the Foundation to Promote Open Society, and is a board member for the International Crisis Group.
Anwar Ibrahim was a board member for the International Crisis Group, and the deputy prime minister for Malaysia.
Richard C. Blum is an honorary trustee at the Brookings Institution (think tank), and married to Senator Dianne Feinstein.
Jessica Tuchman Mathews was an honorary trustee at the Brookings Institution (think tank), a board member for the International Crisis Group, is the president of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (think tank), a director at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (think tank), a director at the American Friends of Bilderberg (think tank), and a 2008 Bilderberg conference participant (think tank).
Ed Griffin’s interview with Norman Dodd in 1982
(The investigation into the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace uncovered the plans for population control by involving the United States in war)
Andrew Carnegie was the founder of the Carnegie Museums of Pittsburgh, the endowed predecessor schools for Carnegie Mellon University, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (think tank), and provided seed funding for the International Court of Justice.
Hisashi Owada is the judge for the International Court of Justice, a director at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (think tank), a director at the Better World Fund, a director at the United Nations Foundation, and was a lifetime trustee at the Aspen Institute (think tank).
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (think tank) was a funder for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (think tank).
Ted Turner is the co-chairman for the Nuclear Threat Initiative (think tank), the founder & chairman for the Better World Fund, the chairman for the United Nations Foundation, and the founder of CNN.
Walter Isaacson was the chairman & CEO for CNN, the chairman for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, and is the president & CEO for the Aspen Institute (think tank).
John F. Kerry is a governor for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the secretary at the U.S. Department of State for the Barack Obama administration, and Cameron F. Kerry’s brother.
Condoleezza Rice was a governor for the Broadcasting Board of Governors, the secretary for the U.S. Department of State, is a trustee at the Aspen Institute (think tank), and a 2008 Bilderberg conference participant (think tank).
Joseph Y. Yun was the deputy assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of State, and is a U.S. ambassador for Malaysia.
James Keith was the deputy assistant secretary for the U.S. Department of State, and a U.S. ambassador for Malaysia.
James S. Crown is a trustee at the Aspen Institute (think tank), and a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago.
Lester Crown was a lifetime trustee at the Aspen Institute (think tank), and is a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago.
Robert S. Osborne is a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago, and the EVP & general counsel for Booz Allen Hamilton.
Edward Snowden was an employee for Booz Allen Hamilton, and leaked information about the National Security Agency (NSA).
Booz Allen Hamilton is a contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA).
Boeing Company is a contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA).
W. James McNerney Jr. is the chairman & president & CEO for the Boeing Company, and a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago.
R. Eden Martin is the president of the Commercial Club of Chicago, and counsel at Sidley Austin LLP
Michelle Obama was a lawyer at Sidley Austin LLP.
Barack Obama was an intern at Sidley Austin LLP.
Newton N. Minow is a senior counsel at Sidley Austin LLP, and a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago.
Commercial Club of Chicago, Members Directory A-Z (Past Research)
Tuesday, December 17, 2013
Cyrus F. Freidheim Jr. is a member of the Commercial Club of Chicago, and an honorary trustee at the Brookings Institution (think tank).
Richard C. Blum is an honorary trustee at the Brookings Institution (think tank), and married to Senator Dianne Feinstein.
Lee H. Hamilton is an honorary trustee at the Brookings Institution (think tank), and a director at BAE Systems Inc.
BAE Systems Inc. is a contractor for the National Security Agency (NSA).
Cameron F. Kerry is a fellow at the Brookings Institution (think tank), John F. Kerry’s brother, was the general counsel; acting secretary for the U.S. Department of Commerce, and an associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr.
Neal S. Wolin was an associate at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, and a special assistant to the director for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).
Stephen W. Preston was a partner at Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr, and is the general counsel for the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).






Eligibility Guidelines for Gaining Security Clearance


Obama couldn't pass the background check to be a security guard at a junk yard unless he lied about his background. Oh yeah, that is how he got his present job.

Eligibility Guidelines for Gaining Security Clearance


Introduction
The following guidelines are established for all individuals who require access to classified information. They apply to persons being considered for initial or continued eligibility, and are used by government departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

Investigative Process
The determination of whether the granting or continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is based upon careful consideration of the following guidelines A-M:

Guideline A: Allegiance to the U.S.
The Concern:
An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance to the United States.


Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Involvement in any act whose aim is to overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of government by unconstitutional means;
  • Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;
  • Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;
  • Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice the prevention of others from exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United States or of any state.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or organization and severed ties upon learning of these;
  • The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or humanitarian aspects of such an organization;
  • Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;
  • The person has had no recent involvement or association with such activities.

Guideline B: Foreign Influence
The Concern:
  • Having close ties with individuals who are not citizens of the United States could create the potential for foreign influence that could result in the compromise of classified information.
  • Contacts with citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries could also create vulnerablilty to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • An immediate family member, or a person to whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a citizen of, resident of, or present in, a foreign country;
  • Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign influence exists;
  • Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with any foreign government;
  • Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign nationals;
  • Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator or employee of a foreign intelligence service;
  • Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;
  • Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;
  • A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual vulnerable to foreign influence.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • A determination that the immediate family member(s), cohabitant, or associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a position to be exploited by a foreign power;
  • Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official U.S. Government business;
  • Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and infrequent;
  • The individual has promptly complied with existing agency requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats from persons or organizations from a foreign country;
  • Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to affect the individual's security responsibilities.
Guideline C: Foreign Preference
The Concern:
  • When an individual acts in such a way as to indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • The exercise of dual citizenship;
  • Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;
  • Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign country;
  • Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;
  • Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship requirements;
  • Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business interests in another country;
  • Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;
  • Voting in foreign elections; and
  • Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in preference to the interests of the United States.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a foreign country;
  • Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;
  • Activity is sanctioned by the United States;
  • Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual citizenship.
Guideline D: Sexual Behavior
The Concern:
  • Sexual behavior that involves criminal offense;
  • Indicates personality or emotional disorders;
  • Subject the individual to coersion, exploitation, or duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion. see footnote)
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Sexual behavior of a criminal nature, whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;
  • Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is unable to stop a pattern of self-destructive or high-risk behavior or which is symptomatic of a personality disorder;
  • Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to coercion, exploitation or duress;
  • Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or which reflects lack of discretion or judgment.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
  • The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;
  • There is no other evidence of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotional instability;
  • The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion, exploitation, or duress.
Guideline E: Personal Conduct
The Concern:
The following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or administrative termination of further processing for clearance eligibility:
  • Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security processing, including medical and psychological testing
  • Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions in connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Reliable, unfavorable information provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other acquaintances;
  • The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of relevant and material facts from investigations to determine security clearance eligibility;
  • Personal conduct or concealment of information that may increase a persons susceptibility to blackmail;
  • A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and the agency.
  • Association with persons involved in criminal activity.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;
  • The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and the individual has subsequently provided correct information voluntarily;
  • The individual made prompt, good-faith efforts to correct the falsification before being confronted with the facts;
  • Omission of material facts was caused or significantly contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and fully provided;
  • The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;
  • A refusal to cooperate was based on ill advice from legal counsel or other officials and, upon being made aware of the issue, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;
  • Association with persons involved in criminal activities has ceased.
Guideline F: Financial Considerations
The Concern:
  • An individual who is financially overextended is at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • A history of not meeting financial obligations;
  • Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement, employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud, filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial breaches of trust;
  • Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;
  • Unexplained affluence;
  • Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse, alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The behavior was not recent;
  • It was an isolated incident;
  • The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business downturn, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or separation);
  • The person has received or is receiving counseling for the problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being resolved or is under control;
  • The affluence resulted from a legal source; and
  • The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue creditors or otherwise resolve debts.
Guideline G: Alcohol Consumption
The Concern:
  • Excessive alcohol consumption can leads to questionable judgment, which may increase the risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;
  • Reporting for work or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the job;
  • Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence;
  • Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed clinical social worker;
  • Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of impaired judgment;
  • Consumption of alcohol after completing a rehabilitation program
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;
  • The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no indication of a recent problem;
  • Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;
  • Successful completion of a rehabilitation program along with aftercare requirements, as well as abstaining from alcohol consumption for at least 12 months.
Guideline H: Drug Involvement
The Concern:
  • Drug abuse or dependence may impair social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Any drug abuse (illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.);
  • Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing, manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;
  • Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional of drug abuse or drug dependence;
  • Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed clinical social worker;
  • Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program prescribed by a credentialed medical professional.
  • Recent drug involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The drug involvement was not recent;
  • The drug involvement was an isolated or aberrational event;
  • A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;
  • Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program, including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence of abuse.
Guideline I: Emotional, Mental and Personality Disorders
The Concern:
  • Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social and occupational functioning.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • An opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;
  • Failure to take a prescribed medication to counter a condition described above;
  • A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social or emotionally unstable behavior;
  • Information that suggests that the individual's current behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • There is no indication of a current problem;
  • Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality disorder is under control and has a low probability of recurrence;
  • The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g., one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.
Guideline J: Criminal Conduct
The Concern:
A history or pattern of criminal activity creates doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.


Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Allegations or admissions of criminal conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;
  • A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The criminal behavior was not recent;
  • The crime was an isolated incident;
  • The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;
  • The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;
  • Acquittal
  • There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

Guideline K: Security Violations
The Concern:
  • Noncompliance with security regulations raises doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability to safeguard classified information.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Unauthorized disclosure of classified information;
  • Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to negligence.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • Were inadvertent;
  • Were isolated or infrequent;
  • Were due to improper or inadequate training;
  • Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of security responsibilities.
Guideline L: Outside Activities
The Concern:
  • Involvement in certain types of outside employment or activities is of security concern if it could create an increased risk of unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
Any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or employment with:
  • A foreign country;
  • Any foreign national;
  • A representative of any foreign interest;
  • Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;
  • The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her security responsibilities.
Guideline M: Misuse of Government Systems
The Concern:
  • Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise security concerns about an individual's ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and information.
Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be disqualifying include:
  • Illegal or unauthorized entry into any information technology system;
  • Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation, or denial of access to information residing on an information technology system;
  • Removal (or use) of hardware, software or media from any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
  • Introduction of hardware, software or media into any information technology system without authorization, when specifically prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;
Conditions that could mitigate security concerns include:
  • The misuse was not recent or significant;
  • The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;
  • The introduction or removal of media was authorized;
  • The misuse was an isolated event;
  • The misuse was followed immediately by a prompt, good faith effort to correct the situation.


When information of security concern becomes known about a person who is currently seeking security clearance, the investigator will consider several factors in determining if clearance should be granted or denied. These factors include:
  • The person voluntarily reported the adverse information;
  • Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;
  • Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where appropriate;
  • Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security concern;
  • Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;
  • Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending final adjudication of the information.
After evaluating information of security concern, the investigator decides whether security clearance will be granted or denied. It may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of access.

http://www.military.com/veteran-jobs/security-clearance-jobs/security-clearance-eligibility.html